Supporting Localism

Hopefully providing some worldview support to a laudable gut instinct

The history of the West has, among other things, included a long, drawn-out conflict between two functional organizing principles – localism and centralization. The former involves the devolution of power to more narrowly defined provincial, parochial centers, while the later involves the concentration of power into the hands of an absolutist system. The tendency toward centralization began as far back as the high Middle Ages, during which the English and French monarchies began the reduction of aristocratic privileges and local divisions and the folding of this power into the rising bureaucratic state with a permanently established capital city and rapacious desire for provincial monies and personnel. The trend towards the development of absolute monarchy continued through the Baroque period, and the replacement of divinely-sanctioned kingship with popular forms of government (republicanism, democracy, communism) did not abate the process, but merely redirected power into different hands. The ultimate form of centralization, not yet come to pass, would be the sort of borderless one-world government desired by today’s globalists, whether they be neoconservatives or neoliberals, which would involve the ultimate consolidation of all power everywhere into one or a few hands in some place like Geneva or New York City.

Against these trends have always been the (often, but not always losing) forces of decentralization. In the Middle Ages, the nobility resisted the increased power of kings. Today, nationalist movements seek to resist one-worldism and global homogenization. Brexit, for instance, involved the efforts of British nationalists to stave off higher level control by the EU over the United Kingdom.

Localism is a noble goal for several reasons. Much is said about “diversity” – however, localism is the best way to actually preserve diversity of cultures, languages, and traditions. In many ways, it is much more culturally “libertarian” than are more “modern” managerial systems. Localism also works to provide circumscribed limits to the exercise of otherwise unrestrained power, distributing power more broadly while yet maintaining an aristocratic, non-populist framework. At the same time, localism is also, in many ways, a better system for the common man because it allows him the option to escape from oppressive rulers, something which is increasingly onerous for those who find themselves within centralized, uniform systems of governance. Below, I’d like to discuss three general areas relating to localism and contrast them with centralization.

The People Involved in Localism versus Centralization

The historical transition from localism to centralization in medieval Europe was seen in the decline of aristocratic rights and the institution of peer kingship, and their replacement with consolidated administrative control over a much larger and generally contiguous geographic area. This control was manifested in the person of the absolute monarch, and was exercised through an impersonal, disinterested bureaucratic apparatus which came to demand a greater and greater share of the national wealth to cover its expenses. This process, I believe, can ultimately be traced back to the strengthening of English and French royal power beginning in the 13th century, especially under Philip IV of France. Its fruition came (while monarchy still exercised effectual power in Europe) in the 17^th-18^th centuries before being undermined by Enlightenment and democratic dogmas which merely transferred the centralizing power to demagogues claiming to speak “for the people.”

Under the old aristocratic system, executive power formed a distributed system and rested on local nobility ruling over a local population with whom they were knowledgeable and on generally good terms. Despite the jaundiced modern view that feudalism was always “tyrannical” and “oppressive,” the fact is that most aristocrats in that era were genuinely devoted to the welfare of the commoners in their land, and it was the responsibility of the nobility to dispense justice and to right wrongs. The picture presented in Kipling’s poem Norman and Saxon most likely serves as a fair reflection of the relationship between lord and commoner. Kingship certainly existed, but the king was viewed as a “first among equals,” one who was the prime lord over his vassals, but who could also himself be a vassal of other kings of equal power and authority (as many of the earlier Plantagenet kings were to the Kings of France, by virtue of their holding fiefs as Dukes of Aquitaine).

False impressions about the role of the aristocracy generally correlate with false impressions about serfdom, the dominant labor relationship of the time. Contrary to popular notions, serfdom was generally not some cruel form of slavery that destroyed human dignity. Indeed, many serfs had liberties approach those of freemen, could transfer allegiances between nobles, enjoyed dozens of feast days (which were effectively vacation days to be devoted to family and community), and could even take themselves off to one of the many free cities which existed and be reasonably sure of not being compelled to return to their former master unless their case was especially egregious.

However, under centralization, the nobility was generally reduced to being ornaments of the royal court, their judicial and administrative functions removed and replaced by a bureaucracy personally loyal to the king. This, in effect, served to remove opportunities for serfs and other commoners to “get away” from the rule of a bad king. Whereas before, a serf could at least hope for the opportunity to flee a bad ruler and seek shelter with a good one, under the uniform rule of the absolute monarch, this was no longer an option unless the commoner wished to flee his entire nation and culture completely. Likewise, the ever-increasing regulation of his daily life by the bureaucracy followed him everywhere he went. By the end of the period, the centralization of power and the rise of crony capitalism led to the destruction of serfdom and the rise of wage capitalism, acting to reduce serfs and freemen alike to the status of cogs in profit-generating machines. The rise of absolute monarchy, part and parcel with the appearance of bureaucracy and the professionalization of military power, led directly to the rise of the modern managerial state.

The Places Involved in Localism versus Centralization

Accompanying this rise in absolutism in executive power was a corresponding centralization of power geographically and the suppression of local cultures and diversity. Within the earlier localist milieu, the interlocking system of lord-vassal loyalties served as a unifying system of personal relationships (which, contrary to what many think, actually served to reduce the extent and viciousness of wars between the nobles), while yet retaining the local flavor of each demesne. Each local culture was able to enjoy relative freedom to “do its own thing” in a way that is practically impossible in even the most libertarian of modern states. The result was a superior blend of stabilizing force arising from the institutions of the aristocracy and peer kingship, while retaining the freedom to live with others of the same blood as you wished to live.

Compare the situation in “France” prior to centralization and geographic consolidation versus that which obtained afterwards. During the heyday of feudalism, “France” was a collection of culturally similar subclades – “true Franks” from the Ile de France, Normans, Burgundians, Aquitanians, Picards, etc. – each with their own customs, dialects, traditions, and so forth. Centralization in France wrought not only the political subordination of these various cultures to Paris, but also resulted in the destruction of their local dialects and many of their local traditions. The modern state of France is essentially the result of destructive cultural imperialism that forced the molding of provincials into factory-bred Frenchmen. Much the same process occurred with centralization in other European states such as Spain, Italy, and Germany.

The seeming irony of this discussion is that localism does not actually preclude imperialism, at least after a fashion. It is certainly possible that instead of the ruthless suppression of local cultures and groups, great empires may pursue policies of aristocladism in which one group dominates politically, while yet allowing for the expression of local sensibilities. This was certainly the model for the Roman Empire and it generally tended to work. In the period I’m generally discussing in this article, we see the example of the Habsburg Empire under Charles V of Spain. At the height of his power, he ruled over half of Europe – Spain, much of Italy, the Low Countries, Austria, the Holy Roman Empire – yet he pursued a policy which generally respected local laws and customs and cultures. Charles was an imperialist, but not a ruthless centralizer of power for its own sake.

I would be remiss if I did not mention at this point one last aspect of localism, this being the free city. Free cities – cities which either absolutely politically free or else were effectively free to conduct their own internal affairs apart from interference by a feudal sovereign - were actually quite common across Europe during the medieval period. This was especially the case in northern Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries - essentially the old and long-standing border zone between the Frankish and Ottonian divisions of the old Carolingian Empire. Cities such as Venice, Florence, Antwerp, Ghent, Lübeck, and Hamburg exercised independent or largely independent sovereignty, and often served as counterbalances to local aristocrats, furthering the distributive nature of power in feudalism and further protecting local cultural flavors. With the rise of centralized absolute monarchies and corresponding bureaucracies, the personal and mobile nature of aristocratic rule declined and the “capital city” arose, leading to a few select cities that prospered while the rest fell into subordination and decline.

The Institutions Involved in Localism versus Centralization

Lastly, the rise of absolute monarchy led to the destruction of alternative centers of power and authority within societies. During the feudal stage of European history, the aristocracy was not the only institution to exercise power. Outside of, but yet in conjunction with the nobility, the Church (both as a universal entity and in its expression through local hierarchs), the monastic orders, the crusading orders, guilds, and leagues served to further distribute power while retaining robust hierarchies within society. Each of these institutions served as “escape valves” allowing commoners to enjoy relatively secure and protected lives, and even opportunities for advancement, while still fitting into the overall hierarchical and traditional molds of their societies.

Absolute monarchy and centralization largely ended the power of these institutions, especially in Protestant countries where this centralization was often pursued the furthest. Many countries saw the destruction of the monastic system and the confiscation of monastic properties by absolute monarchs needing additional sources of revenue. Even in Catholic France, Philip’s destruction of the Knights Templar was largely motivated by greed for their tremendous wealth. Guilds – which served as socially unifying institutions that brought together the economic interests of all members of trade, whether worker, owner, or merchant – saw their economic power essentially destroyed, ultimately to be replaced by trade unions whose basis is explicitly founded on antagonism between economic classes. The brakes on absolute power that first the Catholic church, and then later the various national Protestant churches, successfully placed on earlier feudal rulers were removed once monarchs became absolute and religion brought under the power of the state as an arm of the royal service (especially the case in Tudor England). This had the effect of dehumanizing the rule of these kings and allowing them greater latitude to impose whatever oppressions upon the citizenry they liked. Likewise, once the ameliorating effects of religion were removed, warfare as a general rule became much more vicious and bloodthirsty. It can fairly be said that the reduction of the power of religion led directly to the horrors of the modern world, beginning with the reign of terror during the French Revolution and proceeding to the destruction we still see the effects of today.

In summary, I would like to strongly advocate the superiority of localism and the distributive nature of power that comes with it over and against absolute, centralized monarchy. While it is true that a bad king is still better than a bad democracy, a good king who is restrained by alternative institutions and by a well-coordinated peer group is even better still. The matter is really one of the strength of power rather than its extent. A just and good king may rule with great power within the limits defined by such a system (i.e. he may still be effective and provide stability), while yet not being unrestrained in any or all areas. As we’ve seen, even an imperial system, perhaps more benevolent than some that history has provided, can still exist within the framework of a localist system that respects provincial and civic cultures and traditions. Certainly, centralization of power into the hands of the modern managerial and bureaucratic secular state has been an unmitigated long-term disaster for Europe and the West.